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When systematic risk is high, or the market crashes, most risk-averse investors choose to exit 
the market; however, there are some contrarian investors who opt to make investments. We 
model such contrarian behaviors by incorporating investors’ expectations of government 
policies into the conventional risk-return trade-off framework. We show that when policy risk 
is expected to be low and the market has a high probability to recover, subsequent to the 
government’s intervention, the optimal decision for investors is to make investments. On the 
other hand, when policy risk is high and the market has a high probability to deteriorate, the 
optimal investment decision is to exit. Our simulation results are consistent with the model 
predictions. 
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“Mr. Buffett says he still felt the government had the tools to head off calamity… As the 
government swung into action, Mr. Buffett recalls, he gained confidence that the crisis 
would be resolved.” 
––	The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2009 
 
1. Introduction 
In the midst of a market crash, most risk-averse investors choose to exit the market; 
however, there are some contrarian investors who instead opt to make investments. For 
example, as reported by The Wall Street Journal, during the financial crisis of 2008, 
Warren Buffett looked “into the abyss” in a year of investing dangerously and decided 
to purchase the stocks of Goldman Aches, General Electric, and Burlington Northern 
Santa Fe after the government announced a guarantee of assets in money-market funds 
in September 2008. These deals, according to Warrant Buffett, were based on his faith 
that the government “would stave off the kind of financial catastrophe.”2 
When the stock market crashes and systematic risk elevates, investors expect the 
government to undertake new policies to “save” the market. But whether government 
intervention, through its visible hands, will succeed is uncertain, resulting in a certain 
level of policy risk associated with government intervention. As illustrated by the 
Warren Buffett example, investors appear to make their investment decisions during the 
financial crisis period based on their expected risk of government intervention policies.  
Previous studies have investigated the impact of government political risk or 
uncertainty on asset prices and risk premium. Pastor and Veronesi (2012) analyze how 
changes in government policy affect stock prices using a general equilibrium model 
when there exist uncertainties about government policies and government decisions. 
One of their model’s predictions is that government policy changes are more likely to 
occur after “bad” periods, including downturns or periods of unexpectedly low 
profitability. This prediction is consistent with Alesina et al. (2006) who find evidence 
that crisis is likely to induce government policy reform. Similar findings are also 
reported by political economy literature, including Rodrik (1996), Drazen (2000) and 
																																																																
2 See “In Year of Investing Dangerously, Buffett Looked 'Into the Abyss'”, by Scott Patterson, The Wall 
Street Journal, December 14, 2009.  
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Drazen and Easterly (2001). In a same vein, Pastor and Veronesi (2003) models the 
effect of political uncertainty on risk premia; and their model implies that political risk 
is associated with increased risk premium, with a larger magnitude in weaker economic 
conditions. Such a positive relation between the equity premium and political risk has 
been supported by several empirical studies, including Pantzalis et al. (2000), Li and 
Born (2006), and Broggaard and Detzel (2012).   
In this paper we attempt to explain such risk-seeking behavior of contrarian 
investors by incorporating exogenous government policy risks into the model. 
Contrarian investors are those that do not “herd”, or those with “uncommon strategies” 
(Wei, Wermers, and Yao, 2014). Contrarian investment profit has been attributed to 
investors’ overreactions to both good and bad news (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985). 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) show that value strategies produce higher returns because they 
are contrarian to “naive” strategies followed by other investors. De Haana and Kakesb 
(2011) report that Dutch institutional investors tend to be contrarian traders, i.e. they 
buy past losers and sell past winners. Differing from this behavioral finance perspective, 
our explanation of contrarian investments is derived from a “rational” or traditional 
finance perspective. A uniqueness of our model is that with the traditional risk-return 
framework, we extend the two dimensions of risk-return capital asset pricing model 
(Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossion, 1966) to three dimensions by incorporating 
investors’ expectations of government policies when systematic risk is high: a policy-
risk-return model.  
We show that, in addition to the conventional risk-return trade-off, contrarian 
investors consider government intervention policy risk when they make investment 
decisions during a financial crisis. Our model suggests that, when the policy risk is 
expected to be low and the market has a high probability to become better subsequent 
to the government intervention, the optimal decision for investors is to make an 
investment. On the other hand, when the policy risk is high and the market has a high 
probability to get worse, the optimal investment decision is to exit. Consistent with Lin 
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and Lin (2014), we show that government policies play an important role in affecting 
investors' behaviors. Our simulation results are consistent with the model predictions.3  
 
2. Basic model 
2.1. Contrarian investment return function 
Assuming a certain risk of s and an expected exogenous policy intervention of p，
we model the function for dynamic contrarian investment return m as follows： 
2( , ) (1 ) 1 np p bp ca am s s s= - - + +            （1） 
where b is a return adjustment factor： 1b = ；0 n N< £ ; α is a parameter showing the 
speed of government policy effect; and c is a constant.  
Note that b is a return adjustment factor; it shows the effect (including both the 
direction and the magnitude) of government policy on the market systematic  risk. 
When b > 0, it indicates government policy has positive (good) effect on the systematic 
risk; the larger the b , the bigger the positive effect. That is, the market is getting better. 
When b < 0, it indicates government policy has negative (bad) effect on the systematic 
risk; the larger the b, the bigger the negative effect. That is, the market is getting worse. 
In our model, we assume b = 1, it indicates the effect of government policy on the 
systematic risk is at a “right” level; and the market systematic is back to its normal level.	
When the direction of b is determined, its absolute value affects the magnitude of the 
government policy effect on the market systematic risk.	
Figure below 1 shows a simulated three-dimension dynamic indifference surface 
for contrarian investment return given various systematic risk expectations based on Eq. 
(1).4 The figure is a collection of numerous indifference curves across a continuous-
time stochastic process during a certain time period, with each curve representing a 
trade-off between expected contrarian investment return m and a certain level of risk s. 
The value of p  in the figure indicates the extent to which exogenous policy 
																																																																
3 Similarly, Zhou (2013) models the impacts of the confidence on market equilibrium and shows that a contrarian 
trading pattern arises due to the insider's overconfidence. Vo (2008) shows that early-informed investors may behave 
like contrarians. 
4 According to the Modern Portfolio Theory and Capital Asset Pricing Model, only systematic risk matters in pricing 
capital assets while firm-specific or non-systematic risk can be diversified away in a well-diversified portfolio.  
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intervention affects the systematic risk. The curve (A–A) in Figure 2a depicts contrarian 
investors’ Tobin risk-seeking preference at the beginning of the period, when a 
systematic risk is high (or a financial crisis occurs). At the end of the period, when the 
systematic risk reduces to a normal level, the B–B curve (Figure 2b) depicts contrarian 
investors’ Markowitz risk aversion. The figures shows that, as the effects of exogenous 
policy intervention on the systematic risk increase, the risk feature for contrarian 
investors will change as well; that is, they will gradually become risk-averse, 
transitioning from being originally risk-seeking based on their expected trade-off 
between investment return and systematic risk levels.   
 
Figure 1: Three-dimension of risk, return and policy 
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Figure 2a: A cutoff view for the starting point        Figure 2b: A cutoff view for the ending point 
2.2 Optimizing dynamic contrarian investment return 
Under the traditional capital market pricing model, the market constraint is the 
capital market line, which is formulated based on two dimensions: expected return and 
risk. We introduce the parameter p, or the expected exogenous policy intervention, into 
the CAPM and make it a three-dimensional model as follows:   
( ) ( )
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
m f
f f
m
r p r p
p E r r p r p p
p
m s s l s
s
-
= = + ¥ = + ¥
        （2） 
where ( ) ( )( )
( )
m f
m
r p r p
p
p
l
s
-
=  
Figure 3 below shows the capital market surface, consisting of numerous 
continuously changing capital market lines in a three-dimensional representation. The 
capital market surface is tangent with the return surface.    
 
Figure 3: Capital market surface 
The utility function for contrarian investors is defined as follows: 
2
( , , )
   ( (1 ) 1 )n
U U p
g p bp ca a
s m
m s s
=
= - - - - +                
（3） 
where the first derivate for ( )g ◊  is increasing; that is, '( ) 0g ◊ >  
Without losing generality, we have:  
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2( , , ) (1 ) 1a nU p p bp cas m m s s= - - - - +           （3a） 
In addition to the traditional risk-return trade-off, contrarian investors will 
consider the effect of policy intervention on the systematic risk changes. Therefore, our 
maximization function becomes:  
             
, ,
: ( , , )
p
max U U p
s m
s m=               (4) 
. . : ( )fs t r pm l s= + ¥  
where ( )( )
( )
m f
m
r p r
p
p
l
s
-
=  
             2( , , ) (1 ) 1a nU p p bp cas m m s s= - - - - +       (5) 
 
Figure 4: Contrarian investment decision utility space 
In Figure 4, shown above, the surface is the investors’ utility function, the plane is 
the capital market constraint, and the cluster of curves on the bottom refers to investors’ 
risk-return indifference curves. The figure indicates there is a maximum value in the 
intersection of the components, and it is located at the tangent plane between the capital 
market plane and investors’ risk-return indifference curves. 
 To solve for Eq. (4), we have 
                 
2(1 ) 1
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when 1p = ， 2n = , there exists a solution.  
   
2(1 ) 1 ( ) ( )a a n fp bp c r p ps s l s- - + + = + ¥    (7) 
when 1p = ， 2n = ， 
     
2
fb c rs l s+ = + ¥         (8) 
We then have:  
      
2 0fb c rs l s- ¥ + - =        (9) 
Because 
              
2 2
2 2( ) ( ) 0b bfb c rl ls - + - - =       (10) 
when 
2
2( )bfc r l= + we obtain the sole solution as follows:  
2b
ls =
 
   
2
2bfr lm= +              (11) 
Therefore the optimal point is located at: 
2
,
2 2f
r
b b
l lÊ ˆ˜Á + ˜Á ˜˜ÁË ¯
. The optimal point in an 
empirical setting represents an optimal investment which has a risk of 2b
ls =
 with 
the utility of 
2
2bfr lm= + . The risk of this optimal investment has a positive relation 
with l  and a negative relation withb , whereas l  is one unit of risk premium，b is a 
return adjustment factor. 
 
3. Model extension 
3.1. Considering the uncertainty of systematic risk with policy intervention 
In this section we extend the previous model by considering the uncertainty 
associated with the systematic risk change, which arises as a result of the uncertainty 
associated with the policy intervention outcome. In our one period model, we assume 
that, with the exogenous policy intervention, the market has a probability of q to 
become better and a probability of 1–q to become worse. Our investment return 
function is:  
 9 
	
                  2( , ) (1 ) 1 np p bBpα αµ σ σ σ= − − +               （12） 
where b is return adjustment factor，and B is a random factor following normal 
distribution, ~ (1, )B B q ： 
( 1)
( 1) 1
prob B q
prob B q
= =⎧
⎨
= − = −⎩  
The effects of policy uncertainty on the risk-return trade-off are shown in Figure 5 
below. In reality, there are several types of “uncertainties” related with the government 
policy, including whether the government will introduce new policy, the timing, and the 
effect of such a policy. In our model, we consider the effects of government policy on 
the market systematic risk.   
 
Figure 5: The effect of policy uncertainty on the risk-return trade-off 
B is a random factor in the above equation; its expected return is obtained as: 
2( ( , )) (1 ) 1 (2 1) a nE p p b q pαµ σ σ σ= − − + −    (13)  
Thus the expected value ( ( , ))E pµ σ is a function of q、riskσ , and policy p . 
When p = 1,  
( ( ,1)) (2 1) nE b qµ σ σ= −              (14) 
q is the probability that the market become better. When q = 0.5,  
( ( ,1)) 0E µ σ =           (15) 
0 0.2 0.4
0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
p
σ
µ
 10 
	
Figure 6 shows the contrarian investment expected return. The upward tilted 
surface indicates the return when the market becomes better, or when q = 1. The 
downward tilted surface indicates the return when the market worsens, or when q = 0. 
The surface in the middle shows the expected investment return when q = 0.5.  
 
 
Figure 6: The contrarian investment expected return 
 
3.2 Optimizing dynamic contrarian investment return with uncertainty associated with 
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The expected utility with uncertainty associated with policy intervention is shown 
as follows:  
2( ( , , )) (1 ) 1 (2 1)a a nE U p p b q p cs m m s s= - - - - - +    (16) 
The optimal decision becomes:  
2
,
: [ ( , )] (1 ) 1 (2 1)a a nmax E U p b q p c
µ σ
µ σ µ σ σ= − − − − − +    (17) 
. . : ( )fs t r r pλ σ= + ×  
where ( )( )
( )
m f
m
r p r
p
p
λ
σ
−
=  
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Using the Lagrange multiplier we have:  
2
( , , ) ( ( ) )
(1 ) 1 (2 1) ( ( ) )
f
a a n
f
L U p l r p
p b q p c l r p
s m m l s
m s s m l s
= - - - ¥
= - - - - - + - - - ¥
  (18) 
When p = 1 the above equation becomes:5 
(2 1) ( ( ) )n fL b q c l r pm s m l s= - - + - - - ¥      (19) 
The first order condition is:  
             
1(2 1) 0
1 0
( ) 0
n
f
L b q n l
L l
L r
l
s l
s
m
m l s
-
ÏÔ∂Ô = - - + =ÔÔ∂ÔÔÔ∂Ô = - =ÌÔ∂ÔÔÔ∂ÔÔ = - - - ¥ =Ô∂ÔÓ
           (20) 
We obtain the solution as:  
              
1
1
1
1
1
( )
(2 1)
( )
(2 1)
n
n
f
l
nb q
r
nb q
ls
lm l
-
-
ÏÔÔÔ =ÔÔÔÔÔÔ =ÌÔ -ÔÔÔÔÔ = + ¥ÔÔ -ÔÓ
             (21) 
Thus, the optimal point is located at: 
1 1
1 1( ) , ( )
(2 1) (2 1)
n n
frnb q nb q
λ λ
λ− −
⎛ ⎞
+⎜ ⎟
− −⎝ ⎠. 
Relative to 
previous solution of
2
,
2 2f
r
b b
l lÊ ˆ˜Á + ˜Á ˜˜ÁË ¯
, the difference is the consideration of (2 1)q − . At this 
point it will change in an opposite direction with (2 1)nb q − . Note that q is the 
probability that government policy will have a better effect.  
When n=2，the optimal point is located at: 
2
,
2 (2 1) 2 (2 1)f
r
b q b q
λ λ⎛ ⎞
+⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
. When q 
< 0.5， 0
(2 1)b q
λ
<
−
, does not make sense; that is, when the policy is more likely to 
																																																																
5 When p = 1, the government policy has the largest intervention effect; when p = 0, government has no policy 
intervention.  
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become worse, the optimal decision is not to make an investment, or exit the market. 
 
4. Simulation 
We built a discrete model to simulate the above results. We assume that the 
government introduces the intervention policies in different phases, and the market will 
adjust its expectations accordingly. The policies could make the market better; but they 
could also make the market get worse.  
We build discrete binomial model with n period:  
         2
1
( , ) (1 ) 1 /
n
n
i
i
p p Bbp nα αµ σ σ σ
=
= − − +∑         (22) 
where iB is a binomial random variable， ~ (1, )B B q ，it is equal to 1 or –1.  
          
( 1)
( 1) 1
i
i
prob B q
prob B q
= =⎧
⎨
= − = −⎩                      (23) 
To begin with, we use different values of q to represent investors’ different 
expectations of the effects of government policy on the market systematic risk, based 
on which investors change their investment decisions. We then estimate investors’ 
returns conditional on different values of q and determine the optimal portfolio that will 
generate the largest investment return. Figure 7 shows the multi-period expected return 
volatility when q = 0.8. With the policy intervention, the investment returns could be 
good or bad, with a probability of q to become good. Figure 8 indicates one path of the 
investment return change, whereas Figure 9 shows different paths – thin lines shows 
the specific simulation path and think line shows the expected paths. The figure 
indicates a reverse of investment returns with the policy intervention.  
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Figure 7: Contrarian investment expected return with a multi-period policy intervention 
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Figure 9: Multiple simulated paths of the investment return change 
Figure 10 shows the simulated optimal portfolio investment return when 0.85q = . The 
blue line represents the expected utility using binomial simulation, the red line 
represents the optimal value based on our model calculation, and the green line shows 
the path for the optimal value. These figures show that our theoretical optimal value is 
consistent with our simulated results, providing further support to our model.  
 
Figure 10: Simulated optimal portfolio investment return when 0.85q =  
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can be a good illustration of our theoretical model. The Chinese Stock Market has lost 
more than 30% of its value over a three-week period by July 9, 2015, with 1,400 
companies (more than half listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange) filed for a trading halt 
to avoid further stock crash. The Chinese government has enforced a few policies to 
prevent market crash, including (1) putting a limitation or prohibiting short sell; (2) 
providing cash to brokers to buy shares; (3) stopping IPO (initial public offerings); (4) 
imposing a six-month ban on stockholders with more than 5% of a company’s shares 
from selling their stocks; and (5) cutting the interest rate. Note that the Chinese Stock 
Market is notably different from other developed markets. It is highly speculative and 
dominated by retail investors. A majority of Chinese investors are skeptical whether 
these policies will be effective, when considering the uncertainty associated with these 
policies, as well as the overall Chinese economic condition. Therefore, the optimal 
investment decision for Chinese investors is to exit the market. In fact, after a modest 
rebound in early July, the stock market fell again on 27 July, with a largest single-day 
loss of 8.5 percent since 2007. As of the end of September of 2015, the stock market is 
still about 34% off from its peak in mid-June.6  
5. Conclusions 
 
We propose a model to explain contrarian investors’ investment decisions by 
considering their expectations on the exogenous government policy risk. When the 
stock market crashes and systematic risk becomes high, investors expect the 
government to undertake new policies to “save” the market. But whether government 
intervention will succeed is uncertain, resulting in a certain level of policy risk. We 
show that when the policy risk is expected to be low and the market has a high 
probability to become better subsequent to the government intervention, the optimal 
decision for investors is to make an investment. On the other hand, when the policy risk 
																																																																
6 It is generally believed that the “visible hands” of a government is not good to a well-developed or efficient market. 
However, when the market crashes and the investors become overly panic (irrational), the government intervention 
is helpful. One example is the US government intervention during the recent financial crisis. The policy changes 
from the government will affect investors’ expectation about the market risk and return trade-off, thus affecting their 
investment decisions. 
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is high and the market has a high probability to get worse, the optimal investment 
decision is to exit. Using simulation we provide strong support of our model predictions.  
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